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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1.

What is a reasonable level for that threshold of court

review of obscenity evidence which will assure protection of First
Amendment Principles and yet permit the application of community
standards by a jury?

2.

Did the Court of Appeals require an unnecessarily high

preliminary threshold in this case?

iv

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (App., infra, 1) is
sported at 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 47. The Circuit Courtfs March 28,
989, Order Denying Motion to Dismiss (App., infra, 2) from which
he Respondent Turner sought permission to appeal resulted in an
)rder from the Court of Appeals Denying Interlocutory Appeal (App.,
Infra, 3 ) . The Judgment of the Circuit Court based on the verdict
of a jury (App., infra, 4) was issued on September 25, 1989.

JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on June 6,
1991.

(App. infra, 1)

Rehearing was not requested.

This Court

has jurisdiction under Sec. 78-2-2(3)(a), Replacement Volume 9,
1987 Ed., and Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

v

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
provides, in relevant part, that:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for redress of grievances."
Article I, Sec. 15, of the Utah Constitution provides, in
relevant part, that:
"No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the
freedom of speech or of the press . . . "
St. George City Ordinance No. 2-77-2 provides, in relevant
part, that:
"a. "Obscene" is a word descriptive of any material or
performance which, then taken as a whole and considered
in the context of the contemporary standard of this
community:
(1)
(2)

Appeals to the prurient interest in sex;
Portrays sexual conduct in a patently offensive
manner;
Has no serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value.

(3)
*

*

*

e.
"Sexual conduct" includes any of the following
described forms of sexual conduct if depicted or
described in a patently offensive way:
(2) Masturbation, excretion, excretory functions or lewd
exhibition of the genitals, including any explicit
close-up representation of a human genital organ or
a spread-eagle exposure of female genital
organs."

vi

STATEMENT

1.

On March 28, 1989, trial judge David L. Mower denied

ifendant's Motion to Dismiss, finding "sufficient question of fact
3 to the existence of obscenity to submit the matter to a jury,"
tie Defendant, Brent Allen Turner, sought permission to appeal from
he Interlocutory Order of the circuit court but was denied. Judge
fower properly characterized his ruling as "pivotal", and this
:ourt is now asked to review one of the same issues, the Court of
Appeals after review of the evidence presented at trial having
found favorably for Turner in a split decision. The issue directly
addresses the degree to which a community is free to apply regional
standards to obscenity questions, and the Court of Appeals has
limited that local prerogative in a manner that conflicts with
decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court.
A.

Threshold To Be Applied.

Part (b) of the test given in

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419
contains a substantive component that permits the court to check
juror discretion ("whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law"). Jenkins v. Georgia. 418 U.S. 153, 94 S.Ct.
2750, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 at 650. (The majority opinion below indicates
that the first prong of the Miller test is also subject to the same
threshold, although the cases do not normally apply it to the
pruriency

requirement.)

The

trial

judge

made

preliminary

determination that the threshold had been met, and after hearing
1

the evidence, he denied Turner's motion for a directed verdict on
the basis that the threshold continued to be met. What standard,
if any, do we have to establish an appropriate threshold?
Miller itself gives "a few plain examples" upon which courts
can rely in applying the test formulated therein, and it is
reasonable for the trial court to compare a particular instance of
alleged obscenity with those examples, using them as a form of
minimum criteria*

In Hamlina v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94

S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 at 619, the Court said:
"While the particular descriptions there contained [in
Miller] were not intended to be exhaustive, they clearly
indicate that there is a limit beyond which neither
legislative draftsmen nor juries may go in concluding
that particular material is 'patently offensive1 within
the meaning of the obscenity test set forth in the Miller
cases."
Miller is the standard.

The "plain examples" include, of course,

a "lewd exhibition of the genitals", two instances of which are
alleged

by

question.

Petitioner

to appear on the painted

bedsheet in

This example or criteria from Miller would contradict

the earlier case of Huffman v. United states, 470 F.2d 386 (1971),
cited by the majority opinion below, which seems to hold that
nudity alone can never be hardcore, even where "genitals are made
the focal points of the pictures," and no matter how lewdly they
may be displayed.
The Miller test is applied as a two-step inquiry in U. S. v.
Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 709 F.2d 132 2nd Cir.,
(1983) .

As stated therein, the first step is to see whether the

content of the materials "qualifies as possibly obscene"; in other
2

>rds, does it "depict or describe 'hardcore' types of sexual
mduct

that the trier of fact could constitutionally

patently offensive1".

label

This first part of the Miller test is the

hreshold in issue here. The second step, of course, is submission
,o the jury for determination of whether the materials are patently
>ffensive to the average person in the community, assuming the
first step is answered affirmatively.

The first step is to be

distinguished from determination of whether the materials are
ultimately in fact "obscene" or not. In one case the threshold was
found by the court to have been met but the trier of fact found no
obscenity

(U. S. v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise,

supra), while in another case the trial judge expressed an opinion
that the materials were not obscene but nonetheless found correctly
that the threshold had been met (State v. Lichon, 786 P.2d 1037 at
1043 (Ariz. App. 1989).
Although the case involves reliability of evidence and is
clearly distinguishable from the case here, the court discusses
State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1991) as dealing with the
overlapping roles of the trial court and the jury. Unfortunately,
this is of very limited help in determining the proper threshold
for an obscenity case.

"Where the line is drawn [between those

matters entrusted to the finder of fact and those matters upon
which the court must exercise its own independent judgment] varies
according to the nature of the substantive law at issue."

Bose

Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d
502 at 517. Cases involving First Amendment principles and mixed
3

questions of fact and law may require a higher threshold of
constitutional scrutiny than matters involving the admission of
evidence.

To distinguish the role of the trial court in an

obscenity case from that of the jury, we must still turn to the
definition in Miller, and the courts do so in nearly every instance
where obscenity is the issue.
In the earlier case (1964) of Jacobellis v. Ohio,. 378 U.S.
184, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 12 L.Ed.2d 793, Justice Brennan may have
intended

a

somewhat

higher

threshold

when

he

required

"an

independent constitutional judgment on the facts of the case as to
whether the material involved is constitutionally protected."
Dissenting, Chief Justice Warren and Justice Clark would limit
themselves "to a consideration only of whether there is sufficient
evidence in the record upon which a finding of obscenity could be
made", p. 806.

They state:

" * * * protection of society's right to maintain its
moral fiber and the effective administration of justice
require that this Court not establish itself as an
ultimate censor, in each case reading the entire record,
viewing the accused material, and making an independent
de novo judgment on the question of obscenity.
Therefore, once a finding of obscenity has been made
below under a proper application of the Roth test, I
would apply a 'sufficient evidence' standing of review requiring something more than merely any evidence but
something less than 'substantial evidence on the record
[including the allegedly obscene material] as a whole.'
Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U.S. 474,
95 L.Ed. 456, 71 S.Ct. 456. This is the only reasonable
way I can see to obviate the necessity of this Court's
sitting as the Super Censor of all the obscenity purveyed
throughout the Nation."
Jacobellis was decided prior to Miller, wherein Justice Brennan
dissented.

As stated in Hamlina v. United States, supra, "any
4

stitutional principle enunciated in Miller which would serve to"
iure First Amendment protections must be utilized by the trial
Ige before an obscenity matter is referred to the jury. Whatever
idance we have as to a threshold in obscenity cases must derive
om the opinion in Miller.

B.

Threshold

Here

Not

In

Harmony

With

Miller.

By

stablishing too high a threshold, the decision of the Court of
ppeals improperly applied the Miller test to the facts. The first
wo elements of that test (prurience and patent offensiveness)
ormed the primary basis for that courtfs review of the facts.
Apparently

addressing

prurience, the primary

subject of

3rockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 86
L.Ed.2d 394, the Court of Appeals errs in seeking the response of
one viewing the drawings rather than the intended effect of the
drawings themselves. Miller merely requires that the work appeal
to the prurient interest;

the work must call out to, or be

intended to try and stimulate, one's shameful or morbid interest.
It would be illogical to actually require that it titillate or
provoke a sexual response in the viewer, either normal or abnormal.
As pointed out by F. Schauer, The Law of Obscenity, at p. 102, a
depiction that will arouse a prurient interest in one may arouse
disgust in another.

Indeed, to require the first prong of the

Miller test to mean that the material must sexually excite the
average person is to contradict the second prong which requires
that material to be "offensive" to the average person.
5

To have

prurient appeal the Turner depictions must clearly be sexual in
nature, but they need not arouse.

As stated in Ripplinger v.

Collins, 868 F.2d 1043 (9th Cir. 1989) the "Model Penal Code" of
the American Law Institute "seems to focus on the quality or nature
of the material itself rather than on its actual effect on anyone."
That case rejects the argument that the prurient appeal branch of
the Miller test could only be satisfied if the average person
viewing the material would experience sexual arousal.

It is "the

capacity to attract individuals eager for a forbidden look" that
determines an intended appeal to prurient interests, and "whether
or not the material is successful in doing so is beside the point."
Otherwise, as the court points out, material that is the most
offensive could not be found obscene because the average person
would react to it with revulsion instead of arousal.
The lower court argues that because the depictions are not
artfully done and are vague in the accuracy of their detail, they
cannot be patently offensive. No precedent decision could be found
that addresses this concern, but a somewhat analogous situation may
be found in City of Urbana ex rel. Newlin v. Downing, 539 N.E.2d
140 (Ohio 1989), cert, den., 58 L.W. 3284, where material was found
to be obscene even though genitals were obscured. The Ohio Supreme
Court stated:
"We hold that the industry practice of publishing
photographs with a small black dot obscuring the actual
contact between sexual organs and various orifices does
not preclude a jury from finding representations of
ultimate sexual acts or display of genitals to be
patently offensive."

6

:affiti-effeet cannot dignify or excuse a work that is otherwise
ently offensive, and a quality condition cannot be engrafted
,o the Miller test.

It should also be noted that the trial

lgefs ruling here as well as the jury's verdict was based not
Ly on the rather crude drawings but the words adjacent thereto,
e commonly understood meaning of which further defined and
phasized the artist's intent to appeal to the prurient interest.
As indicated earlier, the Miller test does not require the
rial judge to determine whether or not the "two key drawings
ppeal to the prurient interest and are patently offensive"
penultimate paragraph of Opinion), although the Court of Appeals
eems prepared to make such a judgment. The threshold duty imposed
ipon the trial court by Miller and its progeny is to ascertain that
;here is a reasonable possibility or substantial chance that the
jury might find the material obscene.

Whether a blown-up drawing

of a vagina in shadings of full color labeled "Tunnel of Love" is
a sufficiently cogent example of the "lewd exhibition of the
genitals"

referred

to

in Miller,

for

example,

is

certainly

something the trial judge could properly find to be above the
threshold without necessarily determining that it was obscene, and
he did so.

Although patent offensiveness and prurient appeal are

essentially questions of fact in both situations, the Miller test
was applied by the trial judge to the extent necessary to assure
constitutional protections, and the full question of obscenity was
correctly left to the jury. Jenkins v. Georgia. 41 L.Ed.2d at 650,
is in harmony with the case here; the court found that the facts
7

did not meet the Miller threshold for "there is no exhibition of
the actors' genitals, lewd or otherwise."

C.

What Constitutes the Whole.

To bolster its position in

finding the Turner materials to be constitutionally protected
without reference to community standards, the Court of Appeals
defines the total decor of Turner's shop (three bedsheets) as an
integrated whole.

Superficially, that is effected by labeling

everything displayed in the shop as a "collage".

The trial court

did indicate that the totality was "like a collage", but it further
characterized it as "a whole group of unrelated things
juxtaposed next to one another."

*

*

*

Tr., p. 206-7, 1. 25, 1-2.

More specifically, the lower court applied what it calls the
"Kois test", based on the opinion in Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S.
229, 92 S.Ct. 2245, 33 L.Ed.2d 312.

Kois was decided before

Miller, as pointed out by the lower court, and it refers to "the
dominant theme of the material", a reference coming from the
earlier cases of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) and
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413
(1966) .

After Miller v. California, supra, that phrase was

replaced by the word "work". The change, if significant, would be
to thematically narrow the material focused upon to a single work
or opus, rather than a collection of material having various
themes, one of which is dominant.

8

Even if there is no distinction, however, the total assortment
disparate items on Turner's bedsheets, done at different times
different people, is not susceptible to conversion into a single
ole by virtue of the reasoning in Kois.

The court in Kois did

t consider the newspaper called Kaleidoscope to constitute a
lole.

Instead, thematic integration was found within each

articular article or poetry section. As pointed out by the court
n Upper Midwest Booksellers v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389
t 1393 (8th Cir. 1985) , "the photo in Kois was placed in the midst
)f the text and was related to and illustrated the point of the
article." The comments of Profession Schauer, supra at 108-09, are
pertinent:
"[I]t has . . . been suggested that, in general, the
entire 'physical item,' that is, book, magazine, or other
item, be looked at as a unit. If the 'physical item1
test were rigidly applied, however, it would be far too
easy to include hard-core pornography as one article in
a magazine also containing excerpts from the writings of
D. H. Lawrence or James Joyce.
It would be more
appropriate for the court, and the trier of fact, to make
an evaluation in every instance as to the intended or
likely 'unit of perception. ' A magazine article, or a
single book, or a motion picture, are intended to be seen
or read as a unit, and should therefore be evaluated as
such.
So also when articles or stories are clearly
inter-related and it is intended and expected that they
will be perceived as a unit. But magazine 'articles'
with no connection except that of dealing with the same
general subject matter are not necessarily likely to be
seen or read together, and should therefore be evaluated
separately."
The totality of drawings and writings here is comparable to a
newspaper or magazine, and the specific lower portion of one of the
sheets which deals with a sexual theme can readily be separated
from the rest, both visually and thematically, to constitute a unit
9

of perception, a whole work in and of itself.

The drawings and

accompanying phrases here have no relationship to the other
decorations on the bedsheets other than common bad taste.
Assuming that other elements elsewhere on the bedsheets were
protected speech, the cases are clear that obscenity is not made
acceptable by mixing it in with other communications that may be
acceptable. See the good discussion of this point in United States
v. Merrill. 746 F.2d 458 at 464 (9th Cir. 1984), where the attempt
to insert unrelated items into a collage was not allowed. If the
material in question is not protected speech, its character is not
changed by surrounding it with protected material unless it is
thematically

related

sufficiently

integrated communication.

to

constitute

a

single,

In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.

367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 at 679, it is stated:
"This Court has held that when 'speech1 and 'nonspeech'
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently
important
governmental
interest
in
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms."
Not every admixture of unrelated items becomes a collage, and there
is no evidence here to indicate that an attempt was even made to
unify the diverse elements into a single whole.

While Turner

attempts to characterize the bedsheet containing most of the
offensive material as "a political statement", he acknowledges that
other portions "were meant for Halloween" and are in a different
context.

Tr., p. 240, 1. 10-17.

As for the primary bedsheet,

Turner's attempt to bridge "political" and "sexual" is so strained
as to make it an unlikely base for the holding that there is a
10

Lgle theme. See Tr., p. 228, 1. 8-10 where he states: "And that
>le depiction was supposed to be political in nature, more or
ss, towards (sic) girls to not be a tramp or a whore."

Nearby

olitical" representations include a swastika, a cross, a skull
d crossbones, and a numeral "13".
Lestion

of

any

possible

thematic

There was certainly enough
relationship

to

justify

lbmission of that issue to the jury for its determination.

D.

Effect of Accessibility to Youth.

Notwithstanding the

omments of the Court of Appeals in Footnote 5, Petitioner believes
.'urner's shop was satisfactorily shown to cater to young people,
mcluding children under 18 years of age, and that this is a factor
the trial court and jury should be entitled to consider. Not only
was the shop shown to be outside of a normal commercial area and
not far from a high school (Tr., p. 158-9, 1. 25, 1-14), but Turner
admits that his shop attracts high school students (Tr., p. 236, 1.
6-9) , and there was even a person under 18 present when the
officers visited his shop (Tr., p. 232, 1. 21-23).

The opinion of

the lower court infers that exposure of the materials to minors is
only relevant if the Cityfs ordinance provides time, place, or
manner limitations on the display of materials. Many of the cases,
however, would allow the presence of children to be taken into
consideration in determining the threshold for obscenity regardless
of specific inclusion in a statute or ordinance.

In Pinkus v.

United States. 436 U.S. 293, 98 S.Ct. 1808, 56 L.Ed.2d 293 at 299,
for example, the court implies that if children are intended
11

recipients or are likely to receive the material in question, that
fact is a consideration for the trier of fact.

In his concurring

opinion in State v. Haia, 578 P.2d 837 at 843 (Utah, 1978) Judge
Maughan

characterizes Miller v.

California, supra, as

being

predicated in part upon the theory that the State's interest in
prohibiting

obscenity

should

be

influenced

by

a

mode

of

dissemination that carries with it a significant danger oi; exposure
to juveniles. Even the case of Huffman v. United States, supra, at
405, cited by the Court of Appeals, acknowledges that the absence
of any claim of the distribution of the materials in question to
young people was a factor in its decision.
The shop's dependence upon neighbors in the area as shown by
the absence of a sign, and the fact that it is open only during
hours when the youth of the area are not in school, both support
the probability of high exposure to youthful patrons.

The method

of disseminating the material, of course, is calculated to readily
confront anyone entering the store, regardless of age.

Justice

Stevens, concurring in Carey v. Population Services Intern., 97
S.Ct. 2010 at 2033 (1977), would probably agree that display of
material in a manner and place likely to bring it to the attention
of minors is a factor for consideration:
"A picture which may appropriately be included in an
instruction book may be excluded from a billboard.11
The accessibility of the hanging bedsheets to young members of the
public can properly have been considered by the trial court.

12

2.

By redefining the standard to be used by the trial judge

his preliminary evaluation for assurance that constitutional
larantees are protected, the Court of Appeals has exceeded the
ireshold requirements of Miller v. California, supra, and expanded
:s review into areas that should be left to the trier of fact for
pplication of community standards.

The trial judge adequately

easured the nature and quantum of evidence in light of the Miller
.est, and the Court of Appeals should not overturn his ruling in
:hat regard without a showing that it was clearly erroneous.
3ecause of the advantaged position of the trial court who has the
duty and prerogative of making the initial review discussed herein,
an appellate court should reverse that court's determination only
upon a showing that it is clearly in error or that there was an
abuse of discretion. State v. Meinhart, 617 P.2d 355 (Utah, 1980).
Application of the community standard is a jury function (e.g.,
Hamlina v. United States, 41 L.Ed.2d at 613), and the pertinent
threshold should only require the prosecution to clear a crossbar
comprised of that minimum showing of facts as will suffice to
protect the important constitutional right of free expression.
At

bottom,

the

Court

of

Appeal's

reversal

appears

to

misapprehend the fundamental nature of the appropriate inquiry
required by Miller v. California, supra. Moreover, adoption of the
position taken in its opinion would prevent a jury, as fact finder,
from applying the standards of its community until after the trial
judge had exercised his judgment with regard to substantially the
same totality of facts.

The sensitive issue of standards in a
13

particular community should not be infringed upon once the court's
initial constitutional review shows that it may be possible for
obscenity to exist. Safeguarding the traditional role of a jury as
determiner

of

local

standards

in

these

cases

transcends

adjudicative fact finding and must be carefully observed whenever
basic constitutional protections are otherwise present to a minimum
degree.

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
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GARFF, Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Brent Allen Turner, appeals his conviction of
displaying an obscene picture depicting sexual conduct in
violation of St. George City Ordinance No. 2-77-2. We reverse.
FACTS
Turner operated a retail business in St. George, Utah,
vending hard rock record albums and T-shirts. Turner's small,
signless store was open during evening hours only. He was
charged with violating the St. George obscenity ordinance for
his display of three painted bed sheets which he used as wall
hangings and which were visible to anyone entering the shop.
Several people made their "artistic" contributions to the
sheets as they hung on the wall. The sheets appear to be a
APPENDIX 1

collage consisting of various drawings and slogans in different
sizes and styles. The paint appears to have been sprayed or
brushed on. The pictures and slogans appear crude and
simplistic. Several factors make some of the slogans and
drawings impossible to discern from the record: the quality of
the photographs in the exhibit, the draping of the sheets, and
the fact that some stereo speakers appear in front of the
sheets in the photographs. The slogans and drawings appear
intended to confront and to offend, and are related to sexual,
political, religious, and social themes.
The portion of the
wall hangings that the prosecution claims violates the St.
George ordinance supposedly portrays a woman reclining in a
spread-eagled manner so as to expose her "pubic area,"
represented by three or four black paint spots. The face and
head of the figure could conceivably be that of a dog. Next to
the drawing of the woman is what has been represented to be an
enlarged drawing of a woman's pubic area. Both renditions are
crudely drawn, blurry and indistinct. The quality of the
renderings could best be compared to the graffiti and drawings
frequently found on the walls of a junior high school rest
room.2
Turner was charged with violating St. George City
Obscenity Ordinance No. 2-77-2 §§ 2a(l) and (2). The relevant
portions of this lengthy ordinance are as follows:
No person shall knowingly: (1) Distribute,
display publicly, furnish or provide to
any person any obscene material or
performance.
St. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § 2a(l).
defined as

"Obscene- is

1. The slogans include "Nuke My Ass," "Your [sic] Afraid Face
it," "Group Sex," "Total Peace," "Fuck Authority," "Burn the
Dead," "Eat It," "Live-Die Airborne," "Hell House," "Kill for
God," "Run and Hide Death Will Find You!," "Sold Your Soul,"
"White Flys [sic] Will Eat Your Flesh," "The End," "And Unto
You I Dedicate My Heart,- and -My Right to The World.- The
drawings include a peace symbol, an MX missile, a swastika,
some gravestones, some crosses, some international prohibitive
symbols over the words "life" and -drugs,- a smiling face, a
gun, several skulls, some with cross bones, some with full
skeletons, a door, a mushroom cloud, and a moon.
2* The dissent's description of the two drawings gives the
impression one is looking at an explicit medical illustration
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any material or performance which, when
taken as a whole and considered in the
context of the contemporary standards of
this community:
(1) Appeals to prurient interest in sex;
(2) Portrays sexual conduct in a patently
offensive manner;
(3) Has no serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value.
»t. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § la. The ordinance
provides a lengthy definition of "sexual conduct," the relevant
portion of which is as follows:
(2) Masturbation, excretion, excretory
function or lewd exhibition of the
genitals, including any explicit close-up
representation of a human genital organ or
a spread eagle exposure of female genital
organs.
St. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § le (emphasis added).
A jury found Turner guilty. He now appeals his
conviction on the grounds that (1) the obscenity ordinance was
unconstitutional as applied to him, and (2) the ordinance is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

(Footnote 2 continued)
from Gray's Anatomy, or viewing an exact photograph of the area
in question, leaving no room for dispute as to what the
renditions depict. Such is simply not the case. The second
drawing, described in such intimate detail, could just as
easily be viewed as a beetle, a leaf, or a Zulu war shield. Or
it might more closely resemble a fugitive ink blot from the
Rorschach test ("A personality and intelligence test in which a
subject interprets ten standard black or colored inkblot
designs and reveals through his selectivity the manner in which
intellectual and emotional factors are integrated in his
perception of environmental stimuli." Webster's Medical Desk
Dictionary (1986)). Because the drawings were sufficiently
abstract so as to permit a variety of nonobscene
interpretations, and because of the other reasons enumerated
later in this opinion, the judge, as a matter of law, should
have never permitted the issue to go to the jury.
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FIRST AMENDMENT
In a case where we are required to weigh important first
amendment values of freedom of speech against a charge of
obscenity based on a statute or ordinance that is properly
limited, we exercise independent review when necessary, and
determine, as a matter of constitutional law, whether the
material is to be protected. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153,
160 (1974).3
In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the United
States Supreme Court set forth its definition of obscenity.
The standard has been elaborated in subsequent cases,4 and it
remains the standard for distinguishing between speech, which
is protected by the first amendment of the United States
Constitution, and obscenity, which is not considered speech and
receives no such protection. I£. at 23; Paris Adult Theatre I
v, Slaton. 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 485 (1957).5

3. "[T]he First Amendment values applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequately protected by
the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an
independent review of constitutional claims when necessary."
Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160 (quoting Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 25 (1973)). See also, Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 163-64
(Brennan, J. concurring).
4. For example, Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S.
491 (1985) (elaboration of prurient interest); and Jenkins, 418
U.S. 153 (elaboration of community standards).
5. The prosecution argues that, because the record shop is
near a school and because minors are likely to frequent the
shop, we should apply the lower standard suggested in Erznoznik
v. Citv of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (discussing
content-neutral time, place and manner regulations of speech).
However, the St. George ordinance fails to regulate the time,
place, or manner that sexually explicit material may be
displayed, but instead, it places a content-based restriction
on any display of sexually explicit material. Consequently, we
must apply the stricter test set forth in Miller, 413 U.S. 15*
Additionally, because the shop is unmarked and is only open
evenings, when school is not in session, it does not appear
that minors are especially likely to frequent the shop.
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The Miller test is as follows:
The basic guidelines for the trier of
fact must be: (a) whether the average
person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
413 U.S. at 24 (quotations and citations omitted). The Miller
test is basically incorporated into the St. George ordinance,
except that the ordinance defines "sexual conduct" in ways not
specifically mentioned in Miller. Specifically, the St. George
ordinance prohibits the display of "any explicit close-up
representation of . . . a spread eagle exposure of female
genital organs." St. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § le.
However, among the "plain examples" given by the Miller court
as to what a statute or ordinance can define for regulation as
patently offensive sexual conduct was the "lewd exhibition of
the genitals." Miller, 413 U.S. at 25. We find that, insofar
as the definition describes materials that "depict or describe
patently offensive 'hard core* sexual conduct" and insofar as
that sexual conduct passes muster under the Miller test, which
it must under section 1(a) of the ordinance, the ordinance is
within constitutional limits.6 Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160
(quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 27).
PRURIENT INTEREST AND
PATENTLY OFFENSIVE
The first prong of the Miller analysis requires the trier
of fact to determine whether the "'average person, applying
contemporary community standards' would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest." Miller v.
California/ 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (quoting Roth v. United
States. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).
6. Because we reverse on other grounds, we do not consider
whether the depiction at issue is lewd.

5

Material that appeals to the prurient interest does not
include "material that provpke[s] only normal, healthy sexual
desires." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, I n c . 472 U.S. 491, 498
(1985). Rather, it applies to material that provokes "sexual
responses over and beyond those that would be characterized as
normal." ££[• Specifically, "prurience may be constitutionally
defined for the purposes of identifying obscenity as that which
appeals to a shameful or morbid interest in sex . . . ." Id.
at 504.
The second prong of the Miller analysis is "whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law."
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
When determining what appeals to the prurient interest
and what is patently offensive, the jury is not allowed
unbridled discretion. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160
(1974). The trial judge has a significant role in defining the
extent of the jury's discretion. "Application of the obscenity
standard involves a subjective element on the part of the
tribunal—judge, jury or both—making the critical
determination." Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 397
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C.
Cir. 1974)), In addition, jury discretion is subject to
independent appellate review, when necessary, and by the
requirement that only depictions of patently offensive hard
core sexual conduct be subject to prosecution. Jenkins, 418
U.S. at 160. Therefore, in Jenkins, the Supreme Court did not
hesitate to invade the province of the jury, which the Georgia
Supreme Court had refused to do. In overturning the verdict,
the Supreme Court ruled that the jury did not have sole
discretion to determine that the film Carnal Knowledge was
obscene, and substituted its judgment for that of the jury
because, it concluded, it was "simply not the 'public portrayal
of hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the
ensuing commercial gain1 which we said was punishable in
Miller." 418 U.S. at 162 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 35).
Thus, there is a constitutional threshold of "hard-coreness"
that must be met.
Not only must the statute or ordinance be
constitutionally explicit, but the trial court has the
responsibility to make a threshold determination as to whether
a work may depict hard-core sexual conduct. Only after the
court has reached this conclusion is it appropriate to turn the
matter over to the jury to apply the first two prongs of the
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liller test.
Accordingly, we consider whether the trial court
:orrectly made the threshold determination contemplated in
fenkins. ° The court, in its pretrial order denying a motion to
lismiss, found that "the words and drawing described herein
7. In a recent case, State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7
(1991), the Utah Supreme Court commented on the distinctions
between the overlapping roles of the trial court and the jury.
Even though Ramirez was concerned with the admission of
eyewitness identification, we f:nd the court's comments
appropriate here where the trial court has to make a
preliminary determination of obscenity when that same issue
will have to be redetermined by the jury when the evidence is
considered:
Potential for role confusion and for
erosion of constitutional guarantees
inheres in this overlap of responsibility
of judge and jury to determine the same
issue. Because the jury is not bound by
the judge's preliminary factual
determination made in ruling on
admissibilityt/obscenityj the trial court
may be tempted to abdicate its charge as
gatekeeper to carefully scrutinize
proffered evidence for constitutional
defects and may simply admit the evidence,
leaving all questions pertinent to its
reliability[/obscenity] to the jury. But
courts cannot properly sidestep their
responsibility to perform the required
constitutional admissibility[/obscenity]
analysis. To do so would leave protection
of constitutional rights to the whim of a
jury and would abandon the courts'
responsibility to apply the law.
159 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9.
8. "Judges . . • must take care lest they decide these cases
on the basis simply of their indignation and disgust with the
kind of trash presented. The First Amendment extends to trash,
if it stops short of obscenity . . . ." Huffman, 470 F.2d at
396. Even though a piece may be "dismally unpleasant, uncouth
and tawdry," that alone "is not enough to make [it]
•obscene.fW Manual Enter, v. Dav. 370 U.S. 478, 490 (1962).
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arguably suggest an act which would constitute a violation of
the ordinance, i.e., an act of oral-genital contact."
While the spray painted drawings depict representations
of genitalia, the drawings are too crudely rendered to be
salacious or titillating or to provoke sezual responses, normal
or healthy, much less those that are "over and beyond those
that would be characterized as normal," Brockett, 472 U.S. at
498. "Whatever else may be necessary to give rise to the
States' broader power to prohibit obscene expression, such
expression must be, in some significant way, erotic." Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). The arresting officer
admitted as much at trial. Even though the drawings are
vulgar, offensive, and confrontational, they are too sketchy
and abstract to appeal "to a shameful or morbid interest in
sex." Brockett, 472 U.S. at 504.9 The trial court's pretrial
finding of an "arguable suggestion" is not sufficient to meet
the constitutional test, and our own review of the evidence
leads us to the conclusion that, as a matter of law, these
renderings are not "public portrayal[s] of hard-core sexual
conduct for its own sake, and for the ensuing commercial
gain." Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 161 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at
35) .
Moreover, we cannot judge the drawings in isolation, but
must also consider the written material and other symbols
because Miller requires us to view the collage "taken as a
whole" in determining its appeal to the prurient interest. 413
U.S. at 24. In Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972),10 the
9. "The First Amendment protection for the depiction of nude
women applies even . . . where the pictures focus upon the
pubic areas and poses are struck in such a way as to emphasize
the female genitalia." Huffman, 470 F.2d at 401.
10. Although Kois preceded Miller, Miller frequently cites the
case with approval, indicating an intent to reaffirm the
decision and its analysis. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23, 24, 25, 26,
35, 37, Also, the test in Kois was whether "to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest." Kois, 408 U.S. at 230 (quoting Roth v. United
States. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)). Although this phrase
implies that the Kois phrase "taken as a whole" applies only to
the first part of the Miller test, the crux of Kois was whether
an allegedly obscene depiction had political value. We think
the Kois analysis of "taken as a whole" is helpful in both the
first and third prongs of the Miller test.
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upreme Court considered the context in which an allegedly
bscene work was displayed.. Kois_ involved the publication of a
»hotograph of an embracing nude couple, similar to one
:onfiscated by a Wisconsin district attorney. Because the
iccompanying article was about the confiscation, the Court held
zhat the picture was newsworthy and thus protected. Laying a
[foundation for what would later be the third prong of the
filler analysis, the Court held that context could redeem an
otherwise obscene picture, where there is some contextual
relativity between the offending portion and the rest of the
work: "A quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will
not constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene publication."
408 U.S. at 231. The Court held that because the picture was
"rationally related" and "relevant to the theme of the
article," it was "clearly entitled" to protection. Id.
Here, the two drawings do not appear as a sham attempt to
insulate obscene material with protected material. That is,
while the two drawings may be more confrontational and vulgar
than what appears on the rest of the bedsheets, they are not
entirely out of context with the other depictions of political,
philosophical, musical, social and sexual themes. Because the
work is a collage, there is not a close relationship among all
the slogans and symbols. However, a close relationship is not
the requirement; a rational relationship is. Kois, 407 U.S. at
231. X 1
The two drawings meet the Kois test because they
rationally relate to the immediate context (the wall hangings)
and to the broader context (the record store). The immediate
context is a collage of various symbols and phrases. The
broader context is that of a hard rock record store which vends
heavy metal music, which music is intended, in part, to
challenge traditional ideas and modes of thinking.
Therefore, even if we were to concede, which we do not,
that the two key drawings appeal to the prurient interest and
are patently offensive, we cannot see how the entire collage,
taken as a whole, is so.
11. The jCois Court's use of the phrase "rationally related"
suggests a low level of integration between an offending
picture and its larger context. gee E. Main, The Neglected
Prong of the Miller Test for Obscenity: Serious Literary,
Artistic. Political, or Scientific Value. 11 S. Ill- Univ. L.J.
1159, 1163-64 (1987).

9

Because we conclude, as a matter of law, that the
drawings themselves do not,.appeal to the prurient interest and
are not patently offensive, "and because the drawings rationally
relate to the rest of the collage, which, taken as a whole, is
not patently offensive and does not appeal to the prurient
interest, we find that the drawings are not in violation of the
St- George ordinance.
fte therefore reverse

Regnal W. Garff, Judge.

e conviction,

/•

I CONCUR:

* w
Gregor^K. Orrae, Judge
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ACKSON, Judge (dissenting):
INTRODUCTION
I would affirm Mr, Turner's conviction. He was tried by a
jury of his peers and found guilty of violating an ordinance
tfhich specifically defined constitutionally obscene materials,
^r. Turner was provided fair notice that lewd exhibition of
human genitals to the St. George public, including spread-eagle
exposure of female genital organs, would bring prosecution.
Miller v. California. 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) provides "plain
examples of what a state statute [or city ordinance] could
define [as obscenity] for regulation . . . ." One of Miller* s
plain examples of "hard core" sexual conduct is representation
of "lewd exhibition of the genitals." Id- Thus, the trial
judge could reasonably determine that the ordinance contained a
constitutionally proper and specific definition of obscenity
and that Turner's exhibition of the nude spread-eagle female
and a separate enlarged detailed vulva with open vagina,
exposed labia and clitoris was in violation of the
constitutionally valid ordinance. Accordingly, the trial judge
properly submitted the case to the jury for determination after
denying a pretrial motion to dismiss based only on submission
of Turner's drawings and the city ordinance. The jury saw the
materials, heard the evidence and determined that Turner's
materials were obscene and that he had displayed them to
unwarned members of the public in violation of the city
ordinance.^
FACTS
The statement of "facts" in the main opinion reads like a
subjective treatise in art appreciation, assessing the quality
of Turner's art work as "crude," "simplistic," "abstract,"
"indistinct" and "blurry." However, this attack of adjectives
is irrelevant. The Supreme Court has not indicated that
tasteful, mature, high quality obscenity should be suppressed
or that untasteful, immature, low quality obscenity should go
without regulation. On the other hand, the opinion does
recognize that the "indistinct" drawing is in fact "a woman
reclining in a spread-eagled manner (facing the viewer) so as
to expose her pubic area." The opinion also recognizes the
1. Since Turner accepted the jury instructions "as
constituted," no exceptions, I must conclude that the jury was
properly instructed regarding applicable law.
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drawing next to the woman as a large depiction of a woman's
pubic area but evaluates it^as "blurry." These observations
are highly relevant. This "blurry" drawing (in shades of red
and pink) graphically depicts all of the external female
genitalia. This vulva is surrounded by depictions of pubic
hair done in black. "Genitalia," the word in Miller and the
St. George ordinance, means the reproductive organs, especially
the external sex organs. The American Heritage Dictionary,
Second College Edition 553 (1985). Despite the majority's
protestation in footnote 2 that Turner's depictions might
resemble something else, Turner testified that they were a nude
woman and an enlargement of a "girl's vagina."
Turner's vulva depiction occupies the center of the sheet
(side to side) with the top of the vulva at the center of the
sheet (top to bottom). On the lower half of the sheet, the
left third is occupied by the words of a question with the nude
woman underneath. The question done in black over yellow is:
"Why Not Let
Some One Else
Think For You?"
The upper half of the vulva and pubic hair depiction is
immediately to the right of the three lines in the question.
Between the question and the nude woman is: "Tuna Factory x x
x x" inscribed in a green banner over her head. Between the
nude woman and the vulva is a small sign post with the words
"Tunnel of Love" and a yellow arrow points from the sign to the
lower half of the vulva and pubic hair. Underneath the vulva
and hair are the words "Keep Out" in red. To the right of the
vulva and hair in black are the words:
"It's
Mine
All Mine"
The upper half of the sheet has these slogans across the top
(left to right): "My Right to the World," "Your (sic) Afraid
Face I f and "Live For Yourself" and a round bomb with "Drugs"
inscribed on it. Underneath these items and across the lower
portion of the upper half (left to right) are a skull, a
swastika, a "13," a happy face, and a shield with "AA" on it.
SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The majority disposes of the jury's verdict by virtue of a
"hard core" attack (without defining hard core) and by use
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a "loose" definition of the scope of appellate review in
unting the attack. Their opinion, citing Jenkins v. Georgia,
8 U.S. 153, 160 (1974), states that "the jury is not allowed
ibridled discretion" in making its obscenity determination,
ten the majority claims that Jenkins demonstrates that the
>pellate court should "not hesitate to invade the province of
le jury" and to "substitute its judgment" for the jury's
idgment because the jury "does not have sole discretion" to
ake the obscenity determination. I will first discuss scope
f appellate review and then address the meaning of "hard core"
nd the "average person test" in response to the above
osturing of the main opinion. Later in my opinion I will
each the main opinion's backup position regarding the context
f Turner's work taken "as a whole."
I agree that the jury does not have unbridled discretion
.n an obscenity case. But I also note that my appellate
rolleagues do not have unbridled discretion on review. Our
function is to restrict both the legal and factual
determinations to the constitutional guidelines set forth in
Miller. Miller states that the elements of obscenity—prurient
interest, patent offensiveness and lack of serious value—are
to be determined by the trier of fact, i.e., the jury. 413
U.S. at 26 & n.9; see also Smith v. United States, 431 U.S.
291, 308 (1977). Further, prurient interest and patent
offensiveness are to be measured by the test of an average
person in the community applying contemporary community
standards, which I will discuss in detail below. Thus, we must
give the jury's findings on those elements a fair measure of
deference, particularly in a close case. That does not mean
that obscenity convictions will be virtually unreviewable.
Smith, 431 U.S. at 305. But, " [determinations of prurient
interest and patent offensiveness, and also, therefore, of
contemporary community standards, are such as to indicate that
the major determination should be made by the jury, except in
the more extreme cases." F. Schauer, The Law of Obscenity at
150-51 (1976)(footnotes omitted)[hereinafter Schauer]. Since
the serious value element is to be measured by a "reasonable
person" standard, this determination is more amenable to
appellate review. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 305.
[I]t is also significant to note the
further indication of this decision
rHamlinq v. United States, 418 U.S. 87
(1974)] that although all of the elements
of the Supreme Court's obscenity tests
have a constitutional basis, only the
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[serious] value standard is really a
question of fundamental constitutional
rights- The other tests are mainly
questions of fact requiring a less rigid
standard of review,
Schauer at 125 (emphasis added).
Because the majority fails to recognize the proper scope of
appellate review, it answers the wrong question. Thus, the
analysis quickly adopts a finding that Turner's "renderings are
not public portrayals of hard core sexual conduct", i.e., the
renderings are not obscene. Our function is not to answer the
question of whether Turner's materials are obscene—as the
majority has done. Our function is to answer the question of
whether Turner's materials created a jury question as to
obscenity—as the majority has not done.
The appellate court should review each Miller element and
determine as to that element whether a jury issue has been
created. Instead, the majority disposes of the jury's obscenity
verdict by exercise of their own "hard core" judgment.
A.

The "Hard Core" Judgment

In Huffman, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit correctly observed that prior to 1971, the United States
Supreme Court had not defined the term "hard core"
pornography.2 Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 393 n.9
(1971) rev'd, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court
did not define "hard core" until 1973 in Miller which set forth
specific examples. If material which has failed to pass the
Miller tests for obscenity looks like something different than
Miller's examples, then the jury or trial judge has erred in
application of at least one of the tests. Schauer at 113. The
main opinion relies on Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 162
(1974) as the basis of its obscenity determination, holding that
Turner's drawings do not depict "hard core" sexual conduct. But

2. The main opinion relies on Huffman, a pre-Miller and
pre-Jenkins circuit case for language to support its "hard core"
pornography argument. See nn. 7 & 8. Further, the opinion
utilizes Huffman to support its scope of review position.
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le opinion fails to examine the meaning of "hard core."J Thus,
*fore examining our case in the light of Jenkins, I turn to
iller for the definitive "meaning of "hard core."
Miller states "for the first time since Roth \v. United
tates, 354 U.S. 476] was decided in 1957, a majority of this
ourt has agreed on concrete guidelines to isolate 'hard core'
ornography from expression protected by the First Amendment."
iiller, 413 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added). The Miller guidelines
.nclude concrete examples of "hard core" materials. .One of
:hose examples is "lewd exhibition of the genitals." i£L at
25. This example isolates as "hard core" the very materials
described in the St. George ordinance and exhibited by Turner.
His depictions and descriptions consist of genital imagery and
sexual conduct. Since Miller, the depiction of sexual conduct
does not necessarily require motion or activity.
Jenkins
3. Miller states that under its holding "no one will be subject
to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials
unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive
'hard core' sexual conduct specifically defined by the
regulating state law. . . ." Miller, 413 U.S. at 27. "Depict"
means to present a lifelike image of. Roaet's II, The New
Thesaurus 246 (1980). "Describe" means to give a verbal account
of. LQU at 250. Thus, "hard core" sexual conduct can be
presented in images or words.
4.

Professor Schauer has stated:
In 1973, however, the Supreme Court
specifically stated that only the
depiction of "hard-core" sexual conduct
may be prohibited. As examples of what
might be included, the Court indicated the
following:
(a) Patently offensive
representations or descriptions of
ultimate sexual acts, normal or
perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive
representations or descriptions of
masturbation, excretory functions,
and lewd exhibition of the genitals.
This definition seems to make it clear
that hard-core pornography may include
things other than actual sexual congress
or activity, contrary to the views of a
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states that "we made it plain that under that holding [Miller]
'no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure
of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe
patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct . . . .'"
Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160 (emphasis added)(quoting Miller, 413
U.S. at 27).
Jenkins reiterates the following definitions of "hard core,f
as first set forth in Miller:
We also took pains in Miller to
"give a few plain examples of what a state
statute could define for regulation under
part (b) of the standard announced," that
is, the requirement of patent
offensiveness. id., at 25, 93 S.Ct., at
2615. These examples include
"representations or descriptions of
ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted,
actual or simulated," and "representations
or descriptions of masturbation, excretory
functions, and lewd exhibition of the
genitals." Ibid. While this did not
purport to be an exhaustive catalog of
what juries might find patently offensive,
it was certainly intended to fix
substantive constitutional limitations,
deriving from the First Amendment, on the
type of material subject to such a
determination. It would be wholly at odds
with this aspect of Miller to uphold an
obscenity conviction based upon a
defendant's depiction of a woman with a
bare midriff, even though a properly
charged jury unanimously agreed on a
verdict of guilty.
(Footnote 4 continued)
number of other courts prior to Miller.
These views seemed based primarily on the
SsdlUBL [v, New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967)]
reversals of the Supreme Court, since for
a number of years after 1967 the Court
reversed any obscenity conviction where
the material did not display actual sexual
activity, regardless of the lewd or
suggestive poses of individual models.
Schauer at 111.
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fenkins, 418 U.S. at 160-61 (emphasis added). Jenkins was a
'bare midriff" case. Our case is not. Miller does not mention
Dare midriffs or mere nudity. Miller specifically defines lewd
axhibition of the "genitals." This is our case. In Jenkins
the Supreme Court viewed the film Carnal Knowledge and observed:
While the subject matter of the picture
is, in a broader sense, sex, and there are
scenes in which sexual conduct including
"ultimate sexual acts" is to be understood
to be taking place, the camera does not
focus on the bodies of the actors at such
times. There is no exhibition whatever of
the actors' genitals, lewd or otherwise,
during these scenes. There are occasional
scenes of nudity, but nudity alone is not
enough to make material legally obscene
under the Miller standards.
Id. at 161 (emphasis added).
Having observed that the film depicted "nudity" only and
not "genitals", the Supreme Court held that "the film could
not, as a matter of constitutional law, be found to depict
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way. . . . " I£. at
161. Jenkins and Miller both tell us what can be defined as
"hard core," i.e./ lewd exhibition of the genitals. Jenkins
tells us one thing that can not be considered "hard core,"
i.e., a bare midriff. Jenkins simply does not grant my
colleagues discretion on review to hold as a matter of
constitutional law that Turner's depictions and exhibition of
female genitalia were clearly not obscene and did not create an
issue for the jury. To the contrary, Jenkins and Miller stand
for the proposition that St. George could define, and prohibit
as "hard core" obscenity, the lewd exhibition of the
genitals—even if only by "representation." Miller, 413 U.S.
at 25. The St. George ordinance adopted the Miller
definition. Professor Schauer has stated:
But now, after Miller, it is clear that
hard-core pornography may include material
which does not depict sexual acts, and
"lewd exhibition of the genitals" is
specifically included. This should be
interpreted in the light of a number of
lower court cases defining hard-core
pornography to include photographs which
focus on, exaggerate, or emphasize the
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genitalia or "erogenous zones." It is
this exaggeration or "highlight" on the
genitalia which often distinguishes
hard-core pornography from mere nudity.
Schauer at 111-112,
Turner elected to exhibit materials which highlight and
amplify female genitalia, one of Miller's specific examples of
"hard core." In fact, Turner described the vulva drawing as:
"It's supposed to be a very-enlarged portion of the girl's
pubic area" and the "tunnel of love" represents "a girl's
vagina." Turner's depictions are a form of hard core
pornography well within the types of permissibly proscribed
depictions set forth in Miller and the St. George ordinance.
Accordingly, Turner's materials were sufficient to clearly
present a jury issue as to obscenity. As promised, I now turn
to further consideration of the average person test because the
majority has not given proper deference to this test and has
substituted their own personal judgments for that of the jury.
B.

The Average Person Test

1. Test Applies to Prurient Interest and Patently Offensive
Elements
In 1957, Roth replaced the "most susceptible" person test
of obscenity with the "average person" test. Miller reaffirmed
this test by reciting Roth:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact
must be: (a) whether "the average person,
applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 489).
The Miller Court rejected a national "community standard"
as an exercise in futility. In so doing, the Court relied on
the dissent of Mr. Chief Justice Warren in Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184 (1964) which stated:
It is neither realistic nor
constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of
Maine or Mississippi accept public
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depiction of conduct found tolerable in
Las Vegas, or New York City, People in
different States vary in their tastes and
attitudes, and this diversity is not to be
strangled by the absolutism of imposed
uniformity.
Tacobellis, 378 U.S. at 200 (citations omitted).
In accord with the above rationale, the Miller Court held
"that obscenity is to be determined by applying 'contemporary
community standards', 'not national standards'." Miller, 413
U.S. at 31-32. Miller analyzed this new standard in relation
to both the prurient interest and the patent offensiveness
tests. Both of those tests require a less rigid standard of
review because they are principally questions of fact. The
jurors are to apply this standard as would the average person
in their community. Accordingly, the jurors' analytical
process is as follows: (1) determine, from their own knowledge
of the community, the sense of the average person in the
community; (2) determine from their own knowledge of the
community contemporary community standards; (3) apply those
standards to the work in question and make judgments regarding
appeal to the prurient interest and patent offensiveness. If
these judgments by the jury are in the affirmative, the work is
obscene. If either of these judgments is in the negative, the
work is not obscene. Thus, only the serious value element of
Miller presents a question regarding fundamental constitutional
rights. See, e.g. , Schauer at 125. If the work is obscene,
the jury then determines whether it has serious value which
would save it. This is done by applying the reasonable person
test. Pone v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987).

2s

The Average Person

Who is the mysterious average person? He or she is
neither the most immune nor the most susceptible. "[0]bscenity
is to be judged according to the average person in the
community, rather than the most prudish or the most tolerant• "
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 304 (1977). The Miller
opinion stated the primary concern in requiring a jury to apply
this standard is that the material "will be judged by its
impact on an average person, rather than a particularly
susceptible or sensitive person—or indeed a totally
insensitive one." Miller, 413 U.S. at 33. I note the
continuing emphasis that it is the individual juror who must
divine the standards of the average person in the local
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community* Because this factual judgment is to be exercised by
the peer juror, the prosecution need not produce "expert"
witnesses to testify as to obscenity. Kaplan v. California,
413 U.S. 115, 121-22 (1973). The juror knows as well as any
expert who the average person is and what the contemporary
community standards are. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slafcon.
413 U-S. 49, 56 (1973). The Supreme Court has stated:
A juror is entitled to draw on his own
knowledge of the views of the average
person in the community or vicinage from
which he comes for making the required
determination, just as he is entitled to
draw on his knowledge of the propensities
of a "reasonable" person in other areas of
the law.
Hamlina v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974), quoted in
Smith, 431 U.S. at 302.
This standard requires each juror to tap his or her
knowledge of his or her community in deciding what obscenity
conclusion the average person in the community, applying
contemporary community standards, would reach in a particular
case. Thus, the appellate judge has a formidable, if not
impossible task, in second guessing the juror's personal draw
on his or her "knowledge of the community." How does the
appellate judge divine the sense of the average person in a
distant community where the appellate judge does not reside or
has little, if any, personal knowledge of community mores on
which to draw? Expert witnesses? Not required. "[I]n 'the
cases in which this Court has decided obscenity questions since
Roth, it has regarded the materials as sufficient in themselves
for the determination of the question.'" Kaplan, 413 U.S. at
122 (quoting Ginzburq v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 465
(1966)). How about the local statute? Introduced here.
Helpful evidence, but not conclusive. H[T]he local statute on
obscenity provides relevant evidence of .the mores of the
community who.se legislative body enacted the law." Smith., 431
U.S. at 308. Smith held, as did Miller, that the issues of
prurient interest and patent offensiveness "are fact questions
for the jury, to be judged in the light of the jurors'
understanding of contemporary community standards." let., at
300-01. Thus, we see that the jury is uniquely qualified to
exercise this particular judgment, i.e., the average person
applying contemporary community standards. They must "consider
the entire community and not simply their own subjective
reactions or the reactions, of a sensitive or of a callous
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inority." Id. at 305, And in this case, my appellate
olleagues have little evidence of local community standards
ther than the juror's judgment which has been exercised,
ere, the basic evidence of community mores was each juror's
ersonal knowledge of local standards and the St. George
rdinance. The St. George ordinance contains the Miller
efinitions of hard core obscenity- The ordinance is
ubstantial evidence of a community standard that genitalia
'ill not be lewdly depicted and displayed to the public.
'urner elected to exhibit genitalia, as proscribed, to the
tnwarned members of the public including juveniles who entered
lis place of business. His public exhibition of hard core
laterials created questions for the jury regarding prurient
interest and patent offensiveness. The jury applied the
'average person" test under contemporary community standards
and found in the affirmative. Again, the majority has not
definitively answered the question of whether a jury question
had been created on these issues. Instead, the majority,
without acknowledging the "average person" test simply
substitutes their individual judgments for the judgments
exercised by the jury and summarily announce their own factual
findings (dressed up as conclusions of law) in the negative
stating:
Because we conclude . . . that the
drawings themselves do not appeal to the
prurient interest and are not patently
offensive and because the drawings
rationally relate to the rest of the
collage . . . taken as a whole . . . we
find the drawings are not in violation of
the St. George Ordinance.
TURNER'S WORK "AS A WHOLE"
Since the majority concluded that Turner's work failed the
"hard core" requirement, that should have been the end of the
5. The defense called four witnesses ostensibly to testify
regarding community standards. One had purchased some "mens,w
magazines at some convenience stores in Washington County.
Another had seen "R" rated movies in St. George, including Sea
of Love and Skin Deep, but no "X" rated movies. One indicated
that there were literary works available in Southern Utah which
contained the "F" word, and the last described the place of
nudes in 20th century art. None testified as "experts" nor
stated "expert opinions" regarding community standards.
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opinion, as in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) on which
they rely. Nevertheless, ttie opinion tries to further save the
work from the jury's obscenity determination by analyzing
Turner's work "as a whole."6
A.

Context or Unit of Perception

Obscenity cases have dealt with a book, a movie, a
magazine article, a cartoon, a brochure, each as a unit of
perception.7 What material displayed by Turner is the logical
6. The majority tries to save Turner's work from the jury's
obscenity determination by relying completely on the curious
per curiam case of Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972) for
its "as a whole" analysis. I observe some problems with this
reliance on Kois.
First, Kois was a pre-Miller case. Kois is divided into
two sections using different analyses to dispose of two
separate criminal offenses: (1) an underground newspaper
article which included a photo of a nude couple embracing and
(2) a book of poems which included a poem describing sexual
intercourse.
Second, since Kois was a pre-Miller, "national" community
standards case, the Supreme Court's scope of review was broader
than it would be post-Miller, applying "local" community
standards.
Third, Miller requires a different analytical approach
than was applied in the sex poem section of Kois. There, the
Court looked at the "artistic" value of the poem in question
and considered it to be in the realm of "serious art." From
that premise, the Court decided the dominant theme of the poem
did not appeal to the prurient interest. Under Miller "serious
value" of the work is examined last and only after the work has
failed the prurient interest and patent offensiveness tests.
If so, "serious value" is examined to determine if the work has
value which can save it.
7. The trial judge, the jurors and the appellate judges should
observe the complete "work" as a unit of perception. See
generally Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973) (book);
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (movie); Penthouse
Intern., Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), certdismissed, 447 U.S. 931 (1980) (magazine); Paoish v. Board of
Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973)(per curiam) (political cartoon);
Hamlina v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1984) (advertising
brochure).
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nit of perception? The prosecution offered two separate
heets as units of perception each depicting offensive
aterial. Turner testified that one of the sheets which
ontained, among other slogans and depictions, the words "Group
ex" and "Eat It, Eat Me" was prepared four years earlier as
art of a Halloween motif. Accordingly, it did not bear any
ime relation or context relation to the other sheet depicting
he nude and vulva. Further, Turner's counsel argued to the
rial court that the two sheets were "totally" separate and
lifferent works. The main opinion disregards Turner's view and
.dentifies Turner's "hard rock record store," including the
'collage" of wall hangings, as the unit of perception. I agree
/ith Turner and his counsel that the logical unit of perception
*s to view each of Turner's sheets as separate "paintings" or
*orks. Turner's painting (sheet depicting the nude female and
/ulva), described in detail in my "facts" section above, is the
tfork or unit of perception at issue in this case. Thus, the
single sheet is the "work" to be "taken as a whole" in the
analysis.
B.

Dominant Theme

The question to be asked by trial judge, jury and
appellate judge is:
whether the objectionable materials are
related to text or other materials which
are themselves constitutionally protected,
or whether the text [or other materials
are] merely asserted as a sham to attempt
to shield commercial pornography in a
cloak of legitimacy.
Schauer at 106.
Turner was unable to articulate any text or theme for the
materials on his painting exclusive of the nude and vulva. His
testimony reveals that he had no clear theme. He was not sure,
but he believed his painting "resembles political commentary."
Even Turner's brief concedes that the theme of his "bed sheets
is admittedly difficult to identify precisely." Thus, the
jury, applying the "average person test" could reasonably
conclude that the objectionable sexual depictions and
descriptions could not possibly relate to the other materials
on the sheet because they were themeless, i.e., a diverse
collection of ideas. Further, even if the other materials set
forth a clear "political" theme, the jury could reasonably
conclude that the "sexual" materials had nothing to do with
politics. Moreover, since Turner testified that the two sexual
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depictions were the first materials placed on the sheets (and
the other materials added later had no theme or were not
related, if they had a theme), the jury could have reasonably
concluded that the materials added to the top of the sheet were
indeed a sham attempt by Turner to insulate or shield obscene
material (the lower half of the sheet) with
non-obscene
material. Turner could not identify a dominant theme.8 Since
he could not, the jury had a basis on which to conclude that
Turner's "themeless" materials were merely a sham attempt to
insulate his "objectionable" materials.

Norman H. Jackson, ^Judge
8. The majority creates a "rational relationship" among
Turner's diverse "political, philosophical, musical, social and
sexual themes" by calling his work a collage. Thus, several
entirely unrelated themes are made the "dominant theme" of the
majority with the store as the "context." Accordingly, the
offensive depictions, as part of the collage, in this large
context, are simply meaningless, i.e., not obscene.
This would occur, for example, if the most
obscene items conceivable were inserted
between each of the books of the Bible.
But under existing law, the judges and
juries are able to identify shams in which
non-obscene material is used as a vehicle
to insulate obscene material. As
established in Ginzburo, the "taken as a
whole" test is not quantitative. Under
Miller, even one obscene item contained in
a work would be sufficient to support a
finding that the entire publication is
obscene if, "taken as a whole," the
publication lacks serious value. The
"taken as a whole" test is not
inconsistent with the recognition of shams.
Penthouse Intern., Ltd. v. McAuliffe. 610 F.2d 1353, 1368 (5th
Cir. 1980)(footnote omitted).
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IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

CITY OF ST, GEORGE
ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
-vs-

CASE 881001374
BRENT ALAN TURNER,
Defendant.

The above matter was considered by the court on
February 27, 1989 in St* George, Utah*

present at that hearing

were Mr. Shumway, Mr. Boyack and the Defendant.

The hearing

was held as a supplement to two prior hearings, to-wit: (1) a
hearing on February 10, 1989, in open court in*St. George,
Utah, and (2) a hearing on February 17, 1989 by telephone
conference, not on the record.

All three hearings were held to

consider Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
During the course of the hearings the Court was
allowed to view an item of the Cityfs evidence, namely a
photograph.

A machine copy of the photograph is attached to a

memorandum filed by Mr. Shumway.

The photograph shows a

certain wall-hanging or wall-decoration on display in

APPENDIX 2

City of St, George vs. Turner
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss
Case 881001374 - Page 2

Defendant's place of business on the date when he was charged
with violating a city ordinance.

The wall-hanging appears to

be a bed sheet on which had been written or drawn certain words
and pictures. One of the drawings appears to the court to be a
female person facing the viewer in a reclining, spread-eagle
position.

Although not artfully done, the drawing does show

genitals.

Next to the drawing are the words, "Eat it, eat me".
The City ordinance in question is in the court file

and should be a part of the records in this case.
The Court finds that the words and drawing described
herein arguably suggest an act which would constitute a
violation of the ordinance, i.e., an act of oral-genital
contact.
The ordinance is constitutional on its face. There
is a sufficient question of fact as to the existence of
obscenity to submit the matter to a jury.
The motion to dismiss is denied.
The Court recognizes that this ruling, while not
final, is pivotal in this case.

Counsel may wish to ask the

Utah Court of Appeals for permission to appeal. If such a
petition is filed and to the extent that it is within the

Zity,of St. George vs. Turner
Drder Denying Motion to Dismiss
:ase 881001374 - Page 3

Court's power to do so, the court will favorably respond to a
Motion to Stay Further Proceedings or to such other motion as
will assist with the appeal process.

Dated:

March 28, 1989

IcyyL^^UMs*--^
Circuit Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I
copy of
Dismiss
1989 to

hereby certify that I mailed a full, true and accurate
the within and foregoing Order Denying Motion to
U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid, this 28th day of March,
the following:
T. M. Shumway, St. George City Attorney, 175 East
200 North, St. George, Utah (84770) *
Michael P. zaccheo, Attorney for the Defendant, 50
South Main Street, Suite #700 of Key Bank Tower,
P. O. Box #2465, Salt Lake City, Utah (84111)
Alan D. Boyack, Attorney for Defendant, 205 East
Tabernacle, P. 0. Box #749, St. George, Utah (84701)

S

APR 2^1389
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
t xjot ti'tt Court
L»wr. Cfcurt of AopeaJt

ooOoo

ORDER
DENYING INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

irent Alan Turner,
Petitioner,

Court of Appeals No. 890207-CA

v.
Zity of St. George,
Respondent,

Before Judges Davidson, Jackson and Orme (On Law and Motion) .

The Petition for Interlocutory Appeal is hereby denied.
DATED this 2Y—

day of April, 1989.

BY THE COURT

Judge Richard C. Davidson
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IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF ST. GEORGE,
;i

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
Case No. 881001374

BRENT ALAN TURNER,
Defendant.

The above m a t t e r
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Alan Turner f s
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D0NE

a «».« COUKT this 25 th day of September, 1989

hi

David L. Mower
Circuit Court Judge
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